Corporate Probation Conditions: Judicial Creativity or Abuse of Discretion? by Levin, Marjorie H.
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 52 Issue 4 Article 8 
1984 
Corporate Probation Conditions: Judicial Creativity or Abuse of 
Discretion? 
Marjorie H. Levin 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Marjorie H. Levin, Corporate Probation Conditions: Judicial Creativity or Abuse of Discretion? , 52 
Fordham L. Rev. 637 (1984). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol52/iss4/8 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
CORPORATE PROBATION CONDITIONS:
JUDICIAL CREATIVITY OR ABUSE OF DISCRETION?
INTRODUCTION
Corporate crime' pervades American business.2 To alleviate this
problem, law enforcement authorities must focus on both the corpo-
rate entity and the responsible corporate manager.3 The diffusion of
control within the company often makes it difficult, however, to
identify the culpable individual. 4 Moreover, penalties against white-
collar defendants historically have been too lenient to constitute an
effective deterrent.5 This Note examines appropriate sanctions for
corporate criminal activity. There is little agreement among commen-
tators on the appropriate punishment for institutional criminal behav-
ior.6 A corporation cannot be imprisoned; 7 therefore, the only direct
1. Corporate crime may be defined as the "conduct of a corporation, or of
individuals acting on behalf of a corporation, that is proscribed and punishable by
law." Braithwaite & Geis, On Theory and Action for Corporate Crime Control, 28
Crime & Delinquency 292, 294 (1982).
2. R. Nader, M. Green & J. Seligman, Taming the Giant Corporation 30-32
(1976); Coffee, "No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick": An Unscandalized Inquiry
Into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 386, 386 n.3 (1981);
Orland, Reflections on Corporate Crime: Law in Search of Theory and Scholarship,
17 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 501, 501 n.4 (1980); Note, Structural Crime and Institutional
Rehabilitation: A New Approach to Corporate Sentencing, 89 Yale L.J. 353, 353
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Structural Crime]; Ross, How Lawless are Big Compan-
ies, Fortune, Dec. 1, 1980, at 56, 57. The scope of corporate crime includes price
fixing, food adulteration, conspiracy, bribery and pollution. Coffee, supra, at 386
n.3; Structural Crime, supra, at 354 n.6. The economic impact of corporate crime is
far-reaching. Price fixing, for example, has been called a "common, everyday occur-
rence" that significantly affects the economy. Sims, Antitrust Sentences-A Prosecu-
tor's View, 47 Antitrust L.J. 693, 695 (1978).
3. Coffee, supra note 2, at 387.
4. See H. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 360 (1968); Braithwaite
& Geis, supra note 1, at 298-99; Structural Crime, supra note 2, at 357-59; see also
Sims, supra note 2, at 701 (antitrust crimes difficult to detect); Wheeler & Rothman,
The Organization as Weapon in White-Collar Crime, 80 Mich. L. Rev. 1403, 1422
(1982) (ease with which executives hide behind the corporate entity).
5. See Orland, supra note 2, at 512-13 & n.69 (1980); Sims, supra note 2, at
697.
6. Compare Coffee, supra note 2, at 411-48 (issuing equity securities to a state
victim compensation fund) with Structural Crime, supra note 2, at 364-74 (structural
reorganization of corporate offenders) and Fisse, The Use of Publicity as a Criminal
Sanction Against Business Corporations, 8 Melb. U.L. Rev. 107 passim (publicity
sanction) [hereinafter cited as Fisse I]; cf. Symposium: Sentencing in Criminal Anti-
trust Cases: Too Aluch or Too Little?, 47 Antitrust L.J. 689-752 (1978) (five views on
the sentencing of white collar criminals); H. Packer, supra note 4, at 364 (noting the
dilemma of criminal sanctions); von Hirsch, Recent Trends in American Criminal
Sentencing Theory, 42 Md. L. Rev. 6, 13-14 (1983) ("There has been no new
affirmative consensus on what the rationale of a sentencing system should be.").
7. Melrose Distillers, Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 271, 274 (1959). A corpora-
tion can be "executed" by dissolution. See Orland, supra note 2, at 502 & n.5. This is,
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penal sanction available is a fine.8 There is, however, widespread
criticism of the efficacy of fines to control corporate crime."
The ineffectiveness of fines to control illegal corporate activity can
be illustrated by the record of one company. In 1965, the Olin Corpo-
ration was fined $30,000 for filing false statements to conceal kickback
payments. 10 In 1978, Olin was fined $45,000 for filing false reports to
hide the illegal shipment of arms to South Africa." Again in 1979,
Olin filed false statements to conceal the amount of mercury dis-
charged into the Niagara River and was fined $70,000.12
In response to the perceived inadequacy of fines to control corpo-
rate criminal behavior, some courts have used the Probation Act
(Act)13 to fashion sentencing alternatives for corporate defendants. 14
For example, courts have imposed probation conditions requiring
bakeries convicted of price fixing to deliver bread to the poor 15 and
polluters to develop environmental clean-up programs.' Corporate
probation conditions developed under the Act, however, are con-
strained by the terms of the Act, its rehabilitative purpose, and the
Constitution. In addition, there is a growing discomfort among mem-
bers of Congress, judges, and scholars with the scope of judicial
discretion in fashioning remedies.' 7
however, an extreme remedy that courts are unlikely to utilize. See C. Stone, Where
the Law Ends: The Social Control of Corporate Behavior 36 (1975); Braithwaite &
Geis, supra note 1, at 307.
8. Melrose Distillers, Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 271, 274 (1959).
9. Braithwaite & Geis, supra note 1, at 303; Coffee, supra note 2, at 386-87;
Fisse I, supra note 6, at 107; Orland, supra note 2, at 516-17; Structural Crime,
supra note 2, at 354-55; see Fisse, Community Service as a Sanction Against Corpora-
tions, 1981 Wis. L. Rev. 970, 970 [hereinafter cited as Fisse II].
10. Orland, supra note 2, at 518 & n.91 (citing United States v. Olin-Mathieson
Chem. Corp., No. 63-217 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 1965)).
11. United States v. Olin Corp., No. 78-30, slip op. (D. Conn. June 1, 1978).
12. United States v. Olin Corp., No. 78-38, slip op. (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 1979).
13. Act of March 4, 1925, ch. 521, 43 Stat. 1259 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 3651-3656 (1982)).
14. See, e.g., United States v. Mitsubishi Int'l Corp., 677 F.2d 785, 787 (9th Cir.
1982) (contribute funds and assign executive to community service organization);
United States v. William Anderson Co., 698 F.2d 911, 912 (8th Cir. 1982) (contrib-
ute funds to charitable organizations); United States v. Danilow Pastry Co., 563 F.
Supp. 1159, 1164-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (deliver baked goods to charitable organiza-
tions); United States v. J.C. Ehrlich Co., 372 F. Supp. 768, 769 (D. Md. 1974) (not
violate wildlife preservation laws).
15. United States v. Danilow Pastry Co., 563 F. Supp. 1159, 1163 (S.D.N.Y.
1983).
16. United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 465 F.2d 58, 59 (7th Cir. 1972).
17. See infra note 114.
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This Note examines judicial use of the Probation Act to curb the
proliferation of corporate criminal activity and concludes that the
proposed Comprehensive Crime Control Bill (Bill)18 is a more appro-
priate vehicle under which to sentence corporate offenders. The Bill
expands the permissible goals of probation beyond rehabilitation to
include deterrence and punishment. 9 It also establishes a National
Sentencing Commission to help courts choose the most effective pro-
bation conditions for corporate wrongdoers. 20
I. THE INADEQUACY OF FINES TO CONTROL CORPORATE
CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR
Proponents of monetary sanctions view the corporation solely as a
profit-motivated institution. 21 Provided fines are high enough,22 a
rational decisionmaker will recognize that the benefits of breaking the
law do not exceed its costs. 23 As a result, the sentencing goals of
deterrence and punishment are met by imposing a fine because a
company either will not violate the law or will be financially punished
if caught doing so.
Fines, however, are viewed by many corporate offenders as merely
a cost of doing business. 24 Moreover, the current level of fines does
little to diminish the value of treasured company assets, such as a
corporation's reputation 25 and the satisfaction of its employees. 26 A
fine large enough to threaten corporate viability might alter a compa-
ny's decision to engage in criminal conduct. The constitutional prohi-
bition against cruel and unusual punishment2 7 and notions of fairness
18. S. 1762, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
19. See id. §§ 3553(a), 3561, 3562. See infra note 153 and accompanying text.
20. S. 1762, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 991-998 (1983).
21. See K. Elzinga & W. Breit, The Antitrust Penalties: A Study in Law and
Economics 117 (1976) ("[A]ntitrust violations will occur if the expected utility from
anticompetitive behavior exceeds the expected utility from competing."); R. Posner,
Economic Analysis of Law § 10.12 (2d ed. 1977) (logical remedy for antitrust
violations is damages directed at the corporation that will then be forced to control
illegal employee activity). But cf. C. Stone, supra note 7, at 36-39 (criticizing profit-
maximization analysis); Coffee, Corporate Crime and Punishment: A Non-Chicago
View of the Economics of Criminal Sanctions, 17 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 419, 460 (1980)
(criticizing fundamental premise of corporation as solely a profit-maximizer).
22. The lower the risk of apprehension, the higher the fines must be to have a
deterrent effect. R. Posner, supra note 21, § 7.2, at 167; Coffee, supra note 2, at 389;
Sims, supra note 2, at 701.
23. See K. Elzinga & W. Breit, supra note 21, at 117-18; R. Posner, supra note
21, § 7.2, at 164; Sims, supra note 2, at 701.
24. Orland, supra note 2, at 516.
25. See Braithwaite & Geis, supra note 1, at 301; Fisse I, supra note 6, at 107-08.
26. See C. Stone, supra note 7, at 38.
27. U.S. Const. amend. VIII; K. Elzinga & W. Breit, supra note 21, at 54.
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in sentencing, however, establish a limit on how high a fine can be set
for a particular offense. 28 In addition, some courts are reluctant to
impose significant fines for white-collar crime because they view it as
little more than "aggressive capitalism. 29 Unless imposition of larger
penalties is mandatory,30 it is unlikely that higher fines will be levied.
Even if significant fines are imposed, however, other problems arise
when monetary penalties are the sole sanction used to control corpo-
rate criminal behavior.
The real cost of fines may be borne not by the company, but by
shareholders and consumers, 31 parties with little control over corpo-
rate decisionmaking. 32 Raising the level of fines will not prevent a
corporation from passing along the penalty. Furthermore, the level of
a fine is circumscribed by a company's wealth. 33 A penalty large
enough to accurately reflect the seriousness of the crime often is not
possible because of limited corporate assets. 34
Finally, profit maximization may not be an adequate explanation
of corporate behavior. 35 An economic cost-benefit analysis of institu-
28. See K. Elzinga & W. Breit, supra note 21, at 54; H.L.A. Hart, Punishment
and Responsibility 25 (1968); von Hirsch, supra note 6, at 23-25.
29. Orland, supra note 2, at 511; see H. Packer, supra note 4, at 359; Sims, supra
note 2, at 694.
30. See K. Elzinga & W. Breit, supra note 21, at 134 (suggesting a mandatory
penalty based on 25 % of firm's profits).
31. Coffee, supra note 2, at 401-02; Orland, supra note 2, at 516; Structural
Crime, supra note 2, at 362-63; see United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 465 F.2d
58, 60 (7th Cir. 1972). It has been argued that stockholders should bear the cost of
fines because they benefit from corporate activity. Coffee, supra note 2, at 401.
32. See A. Bearle & G. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property
78-84 (rev. ed. 1968); R. Posner, supra note 21, at 301; Structural Crime, supra note
2, at 355-57. The separation of ownership and control in the modern corporation led
Justice Brandeis to comment:
[T]he lives of tens or hundreds of thousands of employees and the prop-
erty of tens or hundreds of thousands of investors are subjected, through the
corporate mechanism, to the control of a few men. Ownership has been
separated from control; and this separation has removed many of the checks
which formerly operated to curb the misuse of wealth and power.
Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 565 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
33. Coffee, supra note 2, at 390. The varying sizes of companies are taken into
account by the present system. If fines were set solely on the basis of the offense
committed, the result would be patently unfair. Obviously, a fine that would bank-
rupt a small company might not have an effect on a large corporation. See K. Elzinga
& W. Breit, supra note 21, at 132. Therefore, courts have discretion to set the level of
the fine within a broad statutory range. See M. Frankel, Criminal Sentences 5
(1973).
34. See United States v. Danilow Pastry Co., 563 F. Supp. 1159, 1166 (S.D.N.Y.
1983); cf. Higdon v. United States, 627 F.2d 893, 899 (9th Cir. 1980) (court must
evaluate individual defendant's financial condition).
35. See C. Stone, supra note 7, at 36-38; Coffee, supra note 2, at 393; Structural
Crime, supra note 2, at 364.
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tional behavior is an incomplete interpretation of corporate activity.
Diffusion of control in the large publicly-held company36 brings other
factors into the inquiry. For example, the career concerns of individ-
uals and competition among discrete groups within the corporation 37
are critical motivational considerations.
Advocates of fines as the sole sanction assume that top management
has control over those in middle-level management 38 who frequently
commit the crime. 39 The upper echelon, however, is often insulated
from wrongdoing either by choice or organizational structure. 40 As a
result, those high in the corporate hierarchy, who are the most con-
cerned with the corporation's financial health, are often unaware of
the decision to act criminally. Middle-level officials, on the other
hand, are concerned primarily with career advancement 4' rather than
the economic health of the corporate entity. Thus, the threat of a fine
does little to deter their transgressions.
Fines alone do not sufficiently address the complexities of institu-
tional crime. Although a monetary penalty is a useful tool of criminal
sentencing, it is not adequate as a sole remedy to control corporate
criminal activity. As a result of the ineffectiveness of fines, some courts
have used the Probation Act to develop additional sentencing alterna-
tives.
II. THE PROBATION AcT
The Probation Act grants courts the power to avoid statutory penal
sanctions and impose conditions of probation on criminal defend-
ants.42 After the Probation Act was passed in 1925, courts contem-
36. See C. Stone, supra note 7, at 43-44; Braithwaite & Geis, supra note 1, at
298-99; Coffee, supra note 2, at 399; Structural Crime, supra note 2, at 357-59.
37. See Coffee, supra note 2, at 393-400.
38. This conclusion is evident from the belief that fines imposed upon the corpo-
rate entity can control corporate crime. See K. Elzinga & W. Breit, supra note 21, at
132; R. Posner, supra note 21, at 236. This belief incorrectly assumes that upper-level
management can and will control lower-level criminal activity. See infra notes 40-41
and accompanying text.
39. Coffee, supra note 2, at 397.
40. See C. Stone, supra note 7, at 60-62; Coffee, supra note 2, at 397-98;
Structural Crime, supra note 2, at 357-58.
41. See Coffee, supra note 2, at 393-400.
42. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1982). In Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27 (1916), the
Supreme Court held that a court has no authority at common law to suspend the
imposition or execution of a criminal sentence. Id. at 44. The Court premised its
holding on the principle of separation of powers. It is the legislative function to
define crimes and set punishment. Although the judiciary has the power to conduct
trials and impose punishment, courts cannot ignore the sanction fixed by Congress
for the offense. Id. at 41-42; see Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 (1980) (length
of sentence is a matter of "legislative prerogative"); United States v. Evans, 333 U.S.
1984]
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plated only natural defendants as proper subjects for probation. 43 In
the last twelve years, however, courts have interpreted the word
"defendant" in the Act to include corporations. 44
483, 486 (1948) (legislature defines crimes and sets penalties); Morgan v. Devine, 237
U.S. 632, 639 (1915) (Congress defines offenses); United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S.
76, 93, 5 Wheat. 76, 95 (1820) (same). The Ex parte United States holding stopped
the common district court practice of placing defendants on probation. United States
v. Fultz, 482 F.2d 1, 2 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Ellenbogen, 390 F.2d 537,
541 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 918 (1968). The Probation Act, therefore, is the
only source of judicial authority to suspend imposition or execution of sentence and
impose conditions of probation. Roberts v. United States, 320 U.S. 264, 265-66
(1943); United States v. Beacon Piece Dyeing & Finishing Co., 455 F.2d 216, 216-17
(2d Cir. 1972).
43. See, e.g., Roberts v. United States, 320 U.S. 264, 272 (1943) (The basic
purpose of the Probation Act is "to provide an individualized program offering a
young or unhardened offender an opportunity to rehabilitate himself without institu-
tional confinement."); United States v. Murray, 275 U.S. 347, 357 (1928) (purpose of
Act is to give first-time offenders a chance to reform and escape contaminative
influence of prison); United States v. Johnson, 56 F.2d 658, 659 (N.D. Cal. 1932)
(same).
44. United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 465 F.2d 58, 60-61 (7th Cir. 1972);
United States v. J.C. Ehrlich Co., 372 F. Supp. 768, 769 (D. Md. 1974). Courts have
defined the word "defendant" to include corporations in other criminal laws. See,
e.g., United States v. A & P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121, 125 (1958) (dictum) (Motor
Carrier Act of 1935); New York C. & H.R.R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481,
494-97 (1909) (Elkins Act); Joplin Mercantile Co. v. United States, 213 F. 926, 935-
36 (8th Cir. 1914) (federal conspiracy law), aff'd, 236 U.S. 531 (1915). Criminal
statutes that prescribe fines and imprisonment apply to corporations even though
companies are subject to only one category of sanctions-fines. See United States v.
Union Supply Co., 215 U.S. 50, 54-55 (1909). The Probation Act applies to crimes
even when a fine is the only available sanction. United States v. Atlantic Richfield
Co., 465 F.2d at 61.
Institutional responsibility for criminal activity corresponds to the theory of re-
spondeat superior in tort liability. United States v. A & P Trucking Co., 358 U.S.
121, 125 (1958); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 127 (5th Cir.
1962); United States v. Gibson Prods. Co., 426 F. Supp. 768, 770 (S.D. Tex. 1976).
Under this theory, a company is criminally liable for the deeds of its employees acting
within the scope of their employment. New York C. & H.R.R.R. Co. v. United
States, 212 U.S. 481, 493-94 (1909); United States v. Beusch, 596 F.2d 871, 877-78
(9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Demauro, 581 F.2d 50, 53 (2d Cir. 1978). Liability
attaches even if an act is contrary to express instructions, United States v. Hilton
Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125
(1973), as long as the deed was performed with the intent to benefit the company.
United States v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 433 F.2d 174, 204-
05 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971); Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 307 F.2d 120, 128 (5th Cir. 1962); Egan v. United States, 137 F.2d 369, 379
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 788 (1943). A corporate employer may be held
liable for its employees' activities even when the statute does not specifically provide
for such liablity. United States v. Armour & Co., 168 F.2d 342, 343 (3d Cir. 1948).
The corporate entity can be convicted of a charge of which the corporate officers
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The Probation Act is designed to grant the offender a reprieve from
incarceration while promoting his rehabilitation under the supervision
of the court. 45 The Act permits a court to place a convicted offender
on probation under "such terms and conditions as the court deems
best."4 The statute also contains a non-exhaustive listing of probation
conditions that a court may impose. These include the paying of fines,
making restitution, meeting financial support obligations and residing
in a community treatment or drug rehabilitation program.4 7
Although the grant or denial of probation and the imposition of
conditions are final decisions by the trial court,48 such decisions may
be overturned upon a showing that the court clearly abused its discre-
tion.49 Neither punishment nor the avoidance of statutory sentencing
limits may be the primary purpose of a probation condition. 50 A
probation condition is valid only if it is reasonably related to rehabili-
tation of the offender and protection of the public. 51 Nevertheless, the
opportunity for a probationary sentence is a matter of grace rather
than a constitutional right. 52 Thus, a court has broad discretion to
have been acquitted. United States v. American Stevedores, Inc., 310 F.2d 47, 48 (2d
Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 969 (1963); Magnolia Motor & Logging Co. v.
United States, 264 F.2d 950, 953 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 815 (1959). But
see Pevely Dairy Co. v. United States, 178 F.2d 363, 370-71 (8th Cir. 1949) (acquittal
of corporate officers and conviction of corporation illogical), cert. denied, 339 U.S.
1942 (1950). Vicarious institutional liability is justified because a diffusion of control
in most companies often makes it difficult for law enforcement authorities to identify
the culpable actor. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. The corporation has
more power than government authorities to identify and sanction its employees.
Thus, holding the company liable will encourage it to take greater care to control
employee activity. Coffee, supra note 2, at 407-08; see United States v. A & P
Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121, 126 (1958).
45. Roberts v. United States, 320 U.S. 264, 272 (1943); Burns v. United States,
287 U.S. 216, 220 (1932).
46. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1982).
47. Id.
48. Korematsu v. United States, 319 U.S. 432, 433, 436 (1943).
49. United States v. Alarik, 439 F.2d 1349, 1351 (8th Cir. 1971).
50. Higdon v. United States, 627 F.2d 893, 897-98 (9th Cir. 1980).
51. Id.; United States v. Tonry, 605 F.2d 144, 147 (5th Cir. 1979); United States
v. Arthur, 602 F.2d 660, 664 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 992 (1979); United
States v. Pierce, 561 F.2d 735, 739 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 923 (1978);
United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 263-64 (9th Cir. 1975); see 66
Cong. Rec. 5201 (remarks of Rep. Upshaw); id. at 3891 (statement of Rep. Raker).
52. Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 492-93 (1935); Burns v. United States, 287
U.S. 216, 220 (1932); United States v. Alarik, 439 F.2d 1349, 1351 (8th Cir. 1971);
United States v. Birnbaum, 421 F.2d 993, 998 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1044
(1970).
1984]
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grant or deny probation 53 and to decide what probation conditions are
appropriate for rehabilitation of a particular defendant. 54
III. THE LIMITS OF CORPORATE PROBATION CONDITIONS
The permissible conditions enumerated in the Probation Act and
the Act's rehabilitative purpose are the only statutory sources of guid-
ance for a trial court in setting probationary terms. 5 Although the
Probation Act has been liberally construed to expand judicial sentenc-
ing discretion, a court's power to impose probation conditions is not
unlimited. For example, the Act's restitution section may limit mone-
tary conditions of probation, such as ordering the corporate offender
53. Roberts v. United States, 320 U.S. 264, 272 (1943); Burns v. United States,
287 U.S. 216, 220 (1932); United States v. Alarik, 439 F.2d 1349, 1351 (8th Cir.
1971).
54. Roberts v. United States, 320 U.S. 264, 272 (1943); Burns v. United States,
287 U.S. 216, 220-21 (1932); United States v. Tonry, 605 F.2d 144, 148 (5th Cir.
1979); United States v. Arthur, 602 F.2d 660, 664 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
992 (1979); United States v. Kohlberg, 472 F.2d 1189, 1190 (9th Cir. 1973) (per
curiam) (quoting United States v. Chapel, 428 F.2d 472, 474 (9th Cir. 1970)); Porth
v. Templar, 453 F.2d 330, 333 (10th Cir. 1971); United States v. Alarik, 439 F.2d
1349, 1351 (8th Cir. 1971); United States v. Baker, 429 F.2d 1344, 1347 (7th Cir.
1970); United States v. Steiner, 239 F.2d 660, 662 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S.
936 (1957).
55. See United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1975);
18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1982). The Probation Act contains certain procedural limitations
on the granting of probation. A court must place the defendant on probation when
not imposing the statutory sentence. United States v. Lancer, 508 F.2d 719, 735 n.48
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 989 (1975); United States v. Sams, 340 F.2d 1014,
1019-20 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 974 (1965); United States v. ABC Freight
Forwarding Corp., 112 F. Supp. 190, 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); see 18 U.S.C. § 3651
(1982). The court has the option, however, of imposing the sentence on conviction
and suspending its execution, or imposing the sentence at the time of revocation of
probation. Roberts v. United States, 320 U.S. 264, 267-68 (1943). Probation must be
granted before service of a sentence commences. Affronti v. United States, 350 U.S.
79, 83 (1955); United States v. Murray, 275 U.S. 347, 358-59 (1928); United States v.
Beacon Piece Dyeing & Finishing Co., 455 F.2d 216, 217 (2d Cir. 1972). By the terms
of the statute, a court also has the power to modify probation conditions or revoke
probation entirely. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1982). The Supreme Court and courts of
appeals have developed procedural due process guidelines for revocation of probation
and parole. Although probationers do not have the full panopoly of due process rights
available in a criminal trial, they do have the right to an informal hearing. See
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973); Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 493
(1935); United States v. D'Amato, 429 F.2d 1284, 1286 (3rd Cir. 1970); see also
Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 137 (1967) (right to counsel at combined probation
revocation and sentencing hearing); United States v. Dane, 570 F.2d 840, 843 (9th
Cir. 1977) (probationer must have notice of condition before revocation), cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 959 (1978); United States v. Chapel, 428 F.2d 472, 474 (9th Cir.
1970) (same).
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to donate money to a charity.56 Non-monetary conditions must be
reasonably related to rehabilitation of the offender, particularly when
the terms of probation are extraordinary. In addition, all conditions
must meet constitutional standards for probationers.
A. Monetary Conditions of Probation
The restitution section of the Act provides that one permissible term
of probation is restitution to the victim of the crime.57 Some courts
have held that this section bars all monetary conditions of probation
unless the recipient is directly victimized by the crime. 5 The Tenth
Circuit, for example, has twice struck down probation conditions that
56. See, e.g., United States v. William Anderson Co., 698 F.2d 911, 912 (8th
Cir. 1982); United States v. Prescon Corp., 695 F.2d 1236, 1238-39 (10th Cir. 1982);
United States v. Mitsubishi Int'l Corp., 677 F.2d 785, 787 (9th Cir. 1982); United
States v. Clovis Retail Liquor Dealers Trade Ass'n, 540 F.2d 1389, 1390 (10th Cir.
1976); United States v. Missouri Valley Constr. Co., No. 82-L-01, slip op. at 1 (D.
Neb. July 25, 1983), appeal argued, No. 83-2188 (8th Cir. Mar. 15, 1984); United
States v. Wright Contracting Co., 563 F. Supp. 213, 214 (D. Md. 1983).
57. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1982). A narrow reading of the restitution provision limits
a court's authority to order restitution to actual damages suffered by direct victims of
a crime. E.g., United States v. Jimenez, 600 F.2d 1172, 1174 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 903 (1979); United States v. Boswell, 565 F.2d 1338, 1343 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 819 (1978); United States v. Buechler, 557 F.2d 1002, 1007-08 (3d
Cir. 1977); United States v. Hoffman, 415 F.2d 14, 21-22 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 958 (1969); Karrell v. United States, 181 F.2d 981, 987 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 891 (1950); United States v. Follette, 32 F. Supp. 953, 954-55 (E.D.
Pa. 1940); see State v. Stalheim, 275 Or. 683, 688, 552 P.2d 829, 832 (1976)
(restitution not permitted to family of victim); see also United States v. Gering, No.
82-3072, slip op. at 4549 (9th Cir. Sept. 19, 1983) (restitution limited to damages
alleged in the indictment); United States v. Seest, 631 F.2d 107, 110 (8th Cir. 1980)
(restitution limited to actual damages); United States v. Shelby, 573 F.2d 971, 976
(7th Cir.) (restitution condition that gave authority to probation department to
determine amount held too vague), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 841 (1978); United States
v. Mancuso, 444 F.2d 691, 695 (5th Cir. 1971) (amount must be recited in court
order). Even an expansive reading of the restitution section limits payment to victims
of the offense to established amounts. See United States v. Davies, 683 F.2d 1052,
1054 (7th Cir. 1982) (amount established by indictment, plea agreement and pre-
sentence proceedings); United States v. Landay, 513 F.2d 306, 308 (5th Cir. 1975)
(amount established by consent judgement); United States v. McLaughlin, 512 F.
Supp. 907, 908 (D. Md. 1981) (amount established by plea agreement). Some states,
however, are more flexible in ordering restitution. E.g., State v. Cummings, 120
Ariz. 69, 71, 583 P.2d 1389, 1391 (1978) (restitution allowed on an uncharged
burglary); People v. Lent, 15 Cal. 3d 481, 487, 541 P.2d 545, 549, 124 Cal. Rptr.
905, 909 (1975) (en banc) (restitution allowed on counts defendant was acquitted on
because of additional information discovered in probation hearing).
58. United States v. Prescon Corp., 695 F.2d 1236, 1243 (10th Cir. 1982); United
States v. Vaughn, 636 F.2d 921, 923 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v. Clovis Retail
Liquor Dealers Trade Ass'n, 540 F.2d 1389, 1390 (10th Cir. 1976); Karrell v. United
States, 181 F.2d 981, 986-87 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 891 (1950).
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compelled corporate offenders to contribute money to charitable orga-
nizations. 59 The court ruled that all monetary probation terms are
governed by the restitution section of the Act. 60 Thus, unless a charita-
ble organization is a direct victim of the crime, the organization
cannot be a beneficiary of a monetary probation condition. The
Eighth and Ninth Circuits, however, have ruled that the restitution
section does not govern all other monetary conditions of probation,'
Corporate contributions to charitable organizations have been upheld
under the Act's general grant of authority to prescribe probation
conditions.
Historically, the Probation Act has afforded courts broad discretion
to fashion appropriate conditions of probation for a particular of-
fender. 62 The enumeration of specific conditions in the Act does not
hinder a court from imposing non-restitutionary monetary probation
conditions. 63 The Act's use of the term "among" to introduce the list
of conditions indicates that Congress did not intend the enumeration
to be restrictive.6 4 Furthermore, specific enumeration in a statute does
not limit a general provision if "the members of the enumeration,
although specific, are essentially diverse in character."6 ,5 The condi-
tions listed in the Act are diverse. The victim restitution provision, for
example, is clearly distinguishable from the provision that provides for
participation in community treatment programs.66 Thus, the fact that
the Act contains a provision for restitution should not limit the power
59. United States v. Prescon Corp., 695 F.2d 1236, 1243 (10th Cir. 1982); United
States v. Clovis Retail Liquor Dealers Trade Ass'n, 540 F.2d 1389, 1390 (10th Cir.
1976).
60. United States v. Prescon Corp., 695 F.2d 1236, 1242-43 (10th Cir. 1982);
United States v. Clovis Retail Liquor Dealers Trade Ass'n, 540 F.2d 1389, 1390 (10th
Cir. 1976); see United States v. Vaughn, 636 F.2d 921, 923 (4th Cir. 1980); Karrell v.
United States, 181 F.2d 981, 986-87 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 891 (1950).
61. United States v. Mitsubishi Int'l Corp., 677 F.2d 785, 787 (9th Cir. 1982);
United States v. William Anderson Co., 698 F.2d 911, 913 (8th Cir. 1982).
62. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
63. United States v. William Anderson Co., 698 F.2d 911, 914 (8th Cir. 1982);
United States v. Prescon Corp., 695 F.2d 1236, 1242 (10th Cir. 1982); United States
v. Vaughn, 636 F.2d 921, 923 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v. Tonry, 605 F.2d 144,
147 (5th Cir. 1979); see Porth v. Templar, 453 F.2d 330, 333 (10th Cir. 1971).
64. As the court in William Anderson pointed out: "When specifying certain
particular terms as includible 'among' the conditions 6f prohibition [sic], the statute
simply wishes to put beyond question per cautelam the propriety of the particular
terms specified. The meaning is the same as if the familar corporate draftsman's
locution 'including but not limited to' had been used." William Anderson, 698 F.2d
at 914; see United States v. Bishop, 537 F.2d 1184, 1186 (4th Cir. 1976) (statute
stated "among," therefore, conditions listed were not exclusive), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1093 (1977).
65. 2A C. Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 47.20 (4th ed. 1973).
66. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1982). See supra text accompanying note 47.
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of courts to fashion monetary conditions of probation pursuant to the
Act's general grant of authority.67
The basis of victim restitution in the Probation Act is the belief that
compensation of the victim has rehabilitative value for the criminal.68
Therefore, whether a monetary probation condition is permissible
depends upon the condition's rehabilitative effect on the offender.
That is not to say, of course, that charitable contributions could not
have such an impact. Congress apparently concluded, however, that
rehabilitation can be better promoted by offender compensation of
the victim rather than a charitable contribution to an organization
unconnected to the crime.
Rather than proscribing all monetary probation conditions not di-
rectly benefiting victims, courts can remain consistent with the policy
of the Act and preserve their flexibility by imposing such conditions in
limited circumstances.6 9 In cases when the victim is identifiable, any
monetary probation condition should compensate the victim. If the
victim cannot be ascertained, 70 or has already been made whole,' 1 the
Act should not preclude a charitable contribution condition that the
court determines would rehabilitate an offender. 72
67. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. In addition, whether specific
terms in a statute limit the general grant of authority should be determined by
reference to the legislative intent. 2A C. Sands, supra note 65, § 47.18, at 110. The
Act is liberally construed to give courts flexibility in fashioning conditions of proba-
tion for an individual offender. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. Therefore,
it is unlikely that the legislature meant to restrict courts by enumerating particular
terms.
68. See United States v. Buechler, 557 F.2d 1002, 1007 (3d Cir. 1977); United
States v. McLaughlin, 512 F. Supp. 907, 909, 912 (D. Md. 1981); accord State v.
Cummings, 120 Ariz. 69, 71, 583 P.2d 1389, 1391 (1978); People v. Richards, 17 Cal.
3d 614, 622, 552 P.2d 97, 102, 131 Cal. Rptr. 537, 542 (1976); Huggett v. State, 83
Wis. 2d 790, 798, 266 N.W.2d 403, 407 (1978); Harland, Monetary Remedies for the
Victims of Crime: Assessing the Role of the Criminal Courts, 30 UCLA L. Rev. 52,
124 & n.405 (1982).
69. One district court tried to resolve this issue by emphasizing that the monetary
condition was not connected with restitution. The corporate defendant pleaded
guilty to bid rigging and was placed on probation on the condition that it pay
$175,000 to Baltimore City Foundation, Inc. The court held the condition valid
because there was no "factual nexus" between the charitable organization and the
crime committed. The condition, therefore, did not fall within the restitution section
of the Probation Act and thus was not circumscribed by that provision. United States
v. Wright Contracting Co., 563 F. Supp. 213, 214, 217 (D. Md. 1983).
70. See United States v. Danilow Pastry Co., 563 F. Supp. 1159, 1169 n.20
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (large class of consumer victims; individual victims difficult to
identify).
71. In United States v. Danilow Pastry Co., 563 F. Supp. 1159 (S.D.N.Y. 1983),
although a class of the victims was identifiable, the court took into account private
settlements with identifiable victims in fashioning the non-restitutionary probation
conditions. Id. at 1167. Rehabilitation is not served by restitution to the victim for
more than the injury suffered. See State v. Stalheim, 275 Or. 683, 688-89, 552 P.2d
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B. Non-Monetary Probation Conditions: Extraordinary
Terms and Constitutional Limitations
The scope of permissible non-monetary probation conditions is
broad, but not unlimited. Extraordinary probation terms and condi-
tions that impermissibly infringe upon constitutional rights have been
struck down.
1. Extraordinary Probation Terms
Appellate review of probation conditions generally has been limited
to cases of clear abuse of discretion. 73 Severe or unusual probation
terms, however, demand appellate scrutiny to avoid isolated eccen-
tricities.74 Probation conditions "must be narrowly drawn to achieve
rehabilitation and protection of the public without unnecessarily re-
stricting the probationer's otherwise lawful activities." 75 Accordingly,
there is a trend to scrutinize extraordinary probationary terms. 76 For
example, a condition has been overturned that required the defendant
to resign from his state bar association for filing a false income tax
return.77 Similarly, a condition was struck down that required the
defendant to forfeit all his assets and work full-time without pay for a
charity for three years. 78 In determining whether a probation condi-
tion is permissible, the degree of rehabilitation required to reform the
offender should be balanced against the harshness of the condition
imposed.79
When an unusual condition serves a substantial rehabilitative pur-
pose and is not disproportionate to the offense, the condition should be
829, 832 (1976). Recent passage of the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982
(VWPA), Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248 (codified in scattered sections of 18
U.S.C.), has alleviated any need for courts to use the Probation Act to compensate
victims. The VWPA's provision for restitution is primarily aimed at compensation of
the victim. Project, Congress Opens a Pandora's Box-The Restitution Provisions of
the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, 52 Fordham L. Rev. 507, 507-08
(1984).
72. A monetary probation condition, however, cannot exceed the statutory maxi-
mum fine for the offense. Fiore v. United States, 696 F.2d 205, 209 (2d Cir. 1982).
73. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
74. Higdon v. United States, 627 F.2d 893, 898 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Pastore, 537 F.2d 675, 681 (2d Cir. 1976).
75. Higdon v. United States, 627 F.2d 893, 898 (9th Cir. 1980).
76. See, e.g., United States v. Restor, 679 F.2d 338, 340 (3d Cir. 1982); Higdon
v. United States, 627 F.2d 893, 898 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Pastore, 537
F.2d 675, 681 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 465 F.2d 58, 61
(7th Cir. 1972); see also Springer v. United States, 148 F.2d 411, 415-16 (9th Cir.
1945) (Denman & Stephens, J.J., concurring) (probation condition void that re-
quired a selective service violator to donate blood to the Red Cross).
77. United States v. Pastore, 537 F.2d 675, 682-83 (2d Cir. 1976).
78. Higdon v. United States, 627 F.2d 893, 899-900 (9th Cir. 1980).
79. Id. at 898-900.
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sustained. For example, a probation condition that called for whole-
sale bakeries convicted of price fixing to deliver baked goods to com-
munity organizations 0 is consistent with the Act's intent. This condi-
tion was designed to rehabilitate the corporate offender by making
company executives and workers, both of whom participate in com-
plying with the condition, responsible for the corporation's past
wrongdoing. 81
In fashioning conditions of probation, the severity of the conditions
imposed is balanced against the seriousness of the crimes and the
defendants' need for rehabilitation. Courts, however, have different
notions of where this balance should be struck. A condition that
offends the Ninth Circuit's idea of justice may be acceptable to the
Fourth Circuit.82 Therefore, this test does little to determine the types
of conditions that serve a sufficient rehabilitative purpose and the
narrowness with which such conditions must be fashioned.
2. Constitutional Limitations
Although the constitutional rights of probationers may be re-
stricted, s3 probationers do not forfeit all constitutional protection. 4
80. United States v. Danilow Pastry Co., 563 F. Supp. 1159, 1164-65 (S.D.N.Y.
1983).
81. Id. at 1167.
82. Compare Higdon v. United States, 627 F.2d 893, 899-900 (9th Cir. 1980)
(striking charitable work and forfeiture of assets conditions) with United States v.
Arthur, 602 F.2d 660, 661, 664 (4th Cir.) (upholding two-year charitable work
requirement), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 992 (1979).
83. Owens v. Kelley, 681 F.2d 1362, 1366-67 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Tonry, 605 F.2d 144, 148-50 (5th Cir. 1979); Porth v. Templar, 453 F.2d 330, 334
(10th Cir. 1971). Courts have upheld warrantless searches as conditions of probation.
E.g., Owens, 681 F.2d at 1366-67; United States v. Gordon, 540 F.2d 452, 453 (9th
Cir. 1976). But see United States v. Workman, 585 F.2d 1205, 1211 (4th Cir. 1978)
(revocation of probation based on information obtained by warrantless search vio-
lates probationer's fourth amendment rights); United States v. Jeffers, 573 F.2d 1074,
1075 (9th Cir. 1978) (warrantless search probation condition overbroad). A standard
condition of probation that has been upheld is that the defendant associate only with
law-abiding individuals. United States v. Basso, 632 F.2d 1007, 1010 (2d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981); United States v. Albanese, 554 F.2d 543, 546-47
(2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Adderly, 529 F.2d 1182, 1183 (5th Cir. 1976). Some
courts, however, have gone beyond this standard condition to restrict otherwise
lawful associations. E.g., United States v. Bishop, 537 F.2d 1184, 1186 (4th Cir.
1976) (probationer not to frequent racetracks); Malone v. United States, 502 F.2d
554, 556-57 (9th Cir. 1974) (probationer not to associate with Irish organizations),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1124 (1975); United States v. Kohlberg, 472 F.2d 1189, 1190
(9th Cir. 1973) (probationer not to associate with homosexuals); Whaley v. United
States, 324 F.2d 356, 359 (9th Cir. 1963) (probationer not to engage in repossession
business); Berra v. United States, 221 F.2d 590, 598 (8th Cir. 1955) (probationer not
to hold office in a labor organization), aff'd, 351 U.S. 131 (1956).
84. United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 265-67 (9th Cir. 1975). A
probation condition that constituted an outright ban on speech has been struck
1984]
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To determine whether a condition that restricts constitutionally-pro-
tected rights is valid, the degree of infringement must be balanced
against the rehabilitative purposes to be served and the legitimate
needs of law enforcement. 85
First amendment rights are retained by probationers. 8 Nonethe-
less, a condition was upheld that prohibited a corporate defendant,
convicted of mailing obscene material, from engaging in the otherwise
lawful distribution of pornography. 7 The degree of infringement on
the probationer's first amendment rights was outweighed by the reha-
bilitative benefits of the condition.
88
The Tenth Circuit, on the other hand, has struck down a probation
condition that restricted a probationer's right to speak or write about
the constitutionality of taxation. 9 Although the probationer was an
habitual violator of the tax laws,90 his constitutional right to express
an opinion outweighed the condition's rehabilitative value.9' Speech
restrictions in non-commercial settings can be outweighed only by
significant rehabilitative interests. 92
Less constitutional protection, however, is afforded to commercial
than to non-commercial speech.9 3 As a result, a court has more free-
dom to fashion probation conditions that affect a business corpora-
down. See Porth v. Templar, 453 F.2d 330, 334 (10th Cir. 1971); cf. Sobell v. Reed,
327 F. Supp. 1294, 1304 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (parole condition restricting speech in-
valid); Hyland v. Procunier, 311 F. Supp. 749, 750 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (same). But see
United States v. Tonry, 605 F.2d 144, 148 (5th Cir. 1979) (probation condition
upheld that prohibited defendant from engaging in political activities). See generally
Note, Probation Conditions and the First Amendment: When Reasonableness is Not
Enough, 17 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 45 (1981) (review of constitutional restrictions
on probationers).
85. Owens v. Kelley, 681 F.2d 1362, 1366 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Pierce, 561 F.2d 735, 739 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 923 (1978); United
States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 264-65 (9th Cir. 1975).
86. See Porth v. Templar, 453 F.2d 330, 334 (10th Cir. 1971); cf. Sobell v. Reed,
327 F. Supp. 1294, 1304 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (parole); Hyland v. Procunier, 311 F.
Supp. 749, 750-51 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (same).
87. United States v. Nu-Triumph, Inc., 500 F.2d 594, 596 (9th Cir. 1974).
88. See id.
89. Porth v. Templar, 453 F.2d 330, 334 (10th Cir. 1971).
90. Id. at 332.
91. See id. at 334. The court, however, upheld the condition restricting speech to
the extent it prohibited the probationer from encouraging others to violate the tax
laws. Id.
92. See id.; United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 264-65 (9th Cir.
1975).
93. See Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642 (1951); Valentine v. Chresten-
sen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942); SEC v. Lowe, Nos. 83-6108, 83-6116, slip op. at 1105-07
(2d Cir. Jan. 18, 1984).
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tion's, rather than a private individual's, first amendment rights.9 4
Courts, however, are bound by the purpose of the Act and the mea-
sure of first amendment protection that is provided for the corporate
entity."5 Probation conditions that restrict commercial speech, there-
fore, should be substantially related to rehabilitation of the offender. 9
C. The Establishment Clause
There has been little attention paid to who can be a permissible
recipient of corporate probation. Nonetheless, a first amendment issue
may be raised when the charitable organizations designated as recipi-
ents of a monetary or non-monetary probation condition have reli-
gious affiliations. 7
The establishment clause of the first amendment prohibits govern-
ment sponsorship of religion." The clause, however, does not pre-
clude all official contact with religious groups.9 9 The Supreme Court
has developed a three-prong test to determine whether church-state
entanglement in a given case is impermissible. 00 The government
involvement must have both a secular purpose and effect and cannot
result in excessive entanglement with the religious group. 01
The conditions specified by the federal district court in United
States v. Danilow Pastry Co. 10 2-delivery of baked goods to reli-
giously-affiliated community groups' 03-would probably survive un-
94. Cf. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582, 584 (D.D.C.
1971) (upholding statutory ban on advertising of cigarettes), aff'd mem. sub nom.
Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Acting Att'y Gen., 405 U.S. 1000 (1972).
95. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978); see also Consoli-
dated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 533 (1980) (state public
utility order that prohibited utility from inserting discussions of public policy in
electric bills invalid). See generally Note, Constitutional Rights of the Corporate
Person, 91 Yale L.J. 1641 (1982) (critique of theory underlying corporate constitu-
tional rights).
96. See supra text accompanying note 88.
97. See infra notes 102-10 and accompanying text.
98. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970).
99. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736. 745-46 (1976); Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 676 (1970).
100. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 235-36 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S.
349, 358 (1975); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756, 772-73 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
101. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
102. 563 F. Supp. 1159 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
103. The recipient organizations designated by the court included: Catholic Char-
ities of the Archdiocese of New York, Pleasantville Cottage School of the Jewish
Child Care Association of the United Jewish Appeal-Federation of Jewish Philan-
thropies, Federation of Protestant Welfare Agencies, West Side Churches Service
Alliance. Id. at 1165.
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der the test. First, the conditions have a secular purpose' 04-to pro-
mote rehabilitation of the corporate offenders. 05 Second, the
conditions have a secular effect' 06-feeding the community. 0 7 Third,
the court is not excessively entangled with the religious groups. 08 The
extent of government involvement with religious organizations is mea-
sured by the type of government aid and the relationship created
between the government and the religious group. 09 Although the
court and probation authorities supervise the performance of proba-
tion, the Danilow conditions involve the government in the group's
secular rather than religious activities." 0
A more difficult question would be presented if a monetary or non-
monetary condition were used for religious purposes. The court in
United States v. Missouri Valley Construction Co.,"' for example,
required a corporate defendant to establish an ethics chair at the
University of Nebraska.1 2 Had the money been donated to a reli-
giously affiliated university, the condition might not survive an estab-
lishment clause test." 3 This type of condition likely would transgress
the boundaries set by the Supreme Court to guard against government
establishment of religion.
IV. PROBLEMS WITH REMEDIES UNDER THE PROBATION ACT
Even when courts comply with the Probation Act and the Constitu-
tion, corporate probation may not be an effective sentencing tool. The
scholarly consensus against broad judicial sentencing discretion1 4 mil-
itates against the use of the Probation Act to craft extraordinary
104. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 358 (1975) (citing Epperson v. Arkan-
sas, 393 U.S. 97, 107-09 (1968)); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
105. Danilow Pastry Co., 563 F. Supp. at 1166.
106. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 358 (1975) (citing School Dist. of
Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223-26 (1963)); Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
107. Danilow Pastry Co., 563 F. Supp. at 1169 n.20, 1172.
108. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 358 (1975) (citing Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674-76 (1970)); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613
(1971).
109. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615 (1971); Walz v. Tax Comm'n,
397 U.S. 664, 674-76 (1970).
110. Danilow Pastry Co., 563 F. Supp. at 1164-65.
111. No. 82-L-01, slip op. (D. Neb. July 25, 1983), appeal argued, No. 83-2188
(8th Cir. Mar. 15, 1984).
112. Id. at 1.
113. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 250 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421
U.S. 349, 363 (1975).
114. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1983) [hereinafter cited
as Senate Report]; M. Frankel, supra note 33, at 5 (1973); Dershowitz, The Paper
Label Sentences: Critiques, 86 Yale L.J. 619, 629 (1977); Harland, Court-Ordered
Community Service in Criminal Law: The Continuing Tyranny of Benevolence?, 29
Buff. L. Rev. 425, 444-45 (1980).
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remedies." 5 Moreover, rehabilitation may not be the best method of
combatting corporate crime.
A. Unguided Sentencing Discretion
Courts are not institutionally capable of developing effective reme-
dies for corporate criminal behavior without some guidance." 6 Until
recently," 7 Congress had given little attention to the overall goals of
criminal sanctions." 8 Consequently, the judiciary has been left with
almost unbridled discretion in sentencing."" Judicial sentencing deci-
sions are often based upon a particular judge's predilections and indi-
vidual sentencing philosophy rather than coherent policy. 2 0
Nowhere is the confusion over sanctions more pronounced than in
corporate criminal sentencing.12' Courts have made an effort to de-
115. See United States v. Pastore, 537 F.2d 675, 680-81 (2d Cir. 1976); Dersho-
witz, supra note 114, at 628.
116. See Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 1, 4-6 (1972).
117. Congress is currently considering a bill, S. 1762, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983),
that would make deterrence and punishment, as opposed to rehabilitation alone,
legitimate goals of probation. See infra note 153.
118. M. Frankel, supra note 33, at 7; Sims, supra note 2, at 699.
119. United States v. Pastore, 537 F.2d 675, 681 (2d Cir. 1976); Senate Report,
supra note 114, at 38; M. Frankel, supra note 33, at 7-8; Dershowitz, supra note 114,
at 628; Sims, supra note 2, at 699; von Hirsch, supra note 6, at 8-9. Sentences within
statutory limits are subject to only limited appellate review. See Dorszynski v. United
States, 418 U.S. 424, 431 (1974); Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 305
(1932); United States v. Wylie, 625 F.2d 1371, 1379 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1080 (1981); United States v. Short, 597 F.2d 1122, 1124 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 901 (1979). If a trial judge fails to exercise discretion, however, the
sentence may be held invalid. Woosley v. United States, 478 F.2d 139, 143 (8th Cir.
1973); United States v. Daniels, 446 F.2d 967, 971-72 (6th Cir. 1971). If the sentence
is based on false information it may also be held invalid. United States v. Tucker, 404
U.S. 443, 447 (1972); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948). There is usually
no requirement that a court state the reasons for a particular sentence. McGee v.
United States, 462 F.2d 243, 247 (2d Cir. 1972). If a higher sentence is imposed upon
reconviction, however, the judge must state the reasons on the record. North Caro-
lina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 726 (1969). Sentences under the Federal Youth Correc-
tions Act, 18 U.S.C. § 5010(d) (1982), and criminal contempt statutes have been
subject to a higher standard of review. See Dorszynski, 418 U.S. at 425-26 (explicit
finding required that youth would not benefit from sentencing under the Youth
Corrections Act); Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 185 (1958) (higher standard
of review of criminal contempt sentences because of the lack of statutory guidelines).
120. M. Frankel, supra note 33, at 7-8; see United States v. Martell, 335 F.2d 764,
767-68 (4th Cir. 1964); Senate Report, supra note 114, at 38; Sims, supra note 2, at
699.
121. See H. Packer, supra note 4, at 356; Coffee, supra note 2, at 386; see also
Sims, supra note 2, at 701 (analysis of white-collar criminal sanctions termed
"sketchy"). The confusion over appropriate corporate criminal sentences may stem
from a lack of empirical evidence. See Orland, supra note 2, at 503 ("[T]he study of
corporate crime remains a curiously neglected area of scholarship.").
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velop alternatives to fines. Nonetheless, courts are using the Probation
Act to fashion probation conditions that are almost indistinguishable
from fines. Furthermore, the new probation conditions, which allow
funds to be directed to private charities rather than to the public
treasury, may give rise to charges of judicial impropriety. Finally,
disparate sentences for similarly situated defendants offend the idea of
a just sentencing system.
1. Monetary and Non-Monetary Probation Conditions
Compared to Fines
The effect of a non-monetary condition of probation differs from
that of a monetary condition only if there is a relationship among the
particular condition, the crime and the offender. The trial court in
United States v. Mitsubishi International Corp.,122 for example, com-
bined monetary and community service conditions by requiring the
corporate defendants to contribute money and furnish an executive to
aid a community organization in developing its programs.123 The
rehabilitative value of this condition was limited because there was no
relationship between the condition prescribed and the crime commit-
ted. 24 Moreover, the sanction was largely external. Although the
company had to designate an executive to perform the condition, like
the fine there was little internalization of the punishment throughout
the corporation. In contrast, the Danilow conditions, which required
the corporate entity to provide baked goods to community organiza-
tions, 25 forced many of the company's employees to take part in
fulfilling the terms of the company's punishment. 26 Such participa-
tive conditions better achieve the rehabilitative purpose of the Proba-
tion Act.
Monetary conditions of probation also share the shortcomings of
fines discussed in Part I of this Note. To many profitable companies,
monetary conditions, like fines, are simply a cost of doing business.127
The cost of monetary conditions can still be passed along to sharehold-
ers and consumers.128 Moreover, monetary probation terms, like fines,
have little effect on those in middle-level management who frequently
commit the crime.12
122. 677 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1982).
123. Id. at 787.
124. The corporate defendants committed violations of the Elkins Act, 49 U.S.C.
§§ 11,903, 11,915 (1976 & Supp. V 1981), in connection with railroad freight tariffs.
677 F.2d at 786.
125. United States v. Danilow Pastry Co., 563 F. Supp. 1159, 1165 (S.D.N.Y.
1983).
126. Id. at 1167.
127. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
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Furthermore, monetary conditions cannot be sufficiently distin-
guished from imposition of a fine to justify the diversion of money
from the government to a charitable organization. Admittedly, the
Probation Act is not an unconstitutional delegation of the legislative
authority to fix penalties. 30 Although broad sentencing discretion is
vested in the courts by the Act, Congress has sufficiently "expressed its
policy behind the sentencing scheme and the basic values to be consid-
ered."'113 The Constitution, however, gave the legislature the power to
allocate government funds. 32 The judiciary should not usurp this
prerogative without congressional authority by ordering corporate
contributions to charities in lieu of payment of fines to the Trea-
sury. 133
2. Judicial Favoritism
There may also be a problem with judicial favoritism in using
certain types of probation conditions. 34 If a judge is personally affili-
ated with an organization that is the beneficiary of corporate proba-
tion conditions, an erosion of public confidence in judicial integrity
could result. The appearance of judicial impropriety could be avoided
by authorizing another branch of government to designate the benefi-
ciaries of charitable contribution conditions. The probation depart-
ment, for example, frequently deals with community groups in moni-
130. United States v. Baker, 429 F.2d 1344, 1347 (7th Cir. 1970); see Sam v.
United States, 385 F.2d 213, 215 (10th Cir. 1967) (judicial discretion in sentencing
not unconstitutional delegation of legislative power); Yin-Shing Woo v. United
States, 288 F.2d 434, 435 (2d Cir. 1961) (judicial interpretation of statutes in accord-
ance with general congressional purpose not an unconstitutional delegation of legisla-
tive authority).
131. United States v. Baker, 429 F.2d 1344, 1347 (7th Cir. 1970).
132. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 18; see J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young,
Handbook on Constitutional Law 230 & n.1 (2d ed. 1983).
133. See Let the Charity Fit the Crime?, N.Y. Times, Apr. 5, 1978, at 28, col. 1;
cf. Dershowitz, supra note 114, at 626-27 (legislative, not judicial, function to devise
novel punishments).
134. See Let the Charity Fit the Crime?, N.Y. Times, Apr. 5, 1978, at 28, col. 1.
Admittedly courts have tried to designate beneficiaries that are tangentially related
to the offender's crime. See, e.g., United States v. Clovis Retail Liquor Dealers Trade
Ass'n, 540 F.2d 1389, 1390 (10th Cir. 1976) (reversing trial court's probation condi-
tion calling for retail liquor dealers convicted of price fixing to pay portion of fine to
an alcoholism treatment center); United States v. Missouri Valley Constr. Co., No.
82-L-01, slip op. at 1 (D. Neb. July 25, 1983) (probation condition calling for
antitrust violators to set up ethics chair at state university), appeal argued, No. 83-
2188 (8th Cir. Mar. 15, 1984). The asserted relationship between the crime and the
beneficiary, however, is too tenuous to be cognizable. It is unclear why a particular
neighborhood alcoholism center or university should benefit from judicially-imposed
corporate contributions.
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toring probation. 135 Therefore, it is better able to assess and designate
a broad range of worthy recipients. Alternatively, courts could avoid
charges of favoritism by relying on a pre-established list of charities.
3. Disparate Conditions
The current sentencing system provides little guidance to a trial
judge in sentencing offenders. Any sentence within the broad statu-
tory range set for a particular crime is valid. 13 Discretion in fixing
penalties is premised on rehabilitation as the primary goal in sentenc-
ing. 137 Successful rehabilitation of a defendant requires that sentences
fit the offender rather than the offense.' 38 The resulting system pro-
duces wide-ranging disparities in sentences meted out to similiarly
situated offenders. 139 Thus, rather than adhering to a coherent sen-
tencing policy, probation conditions often reflect a particular judge's
sentencing philosophy. As one federal judge noted: "[M]any judges
develop their own pet theories of crime control, some times displacing
legitimate sentencing objectives."'' 40
The broad discretion accorded a trial court by the Probation Act in
fashioning probation conditions 14' exacerbates the problem of dispar-
ate sentences. Corporate probation conditions have ranged from char-
itable contributions 142 to training ex-offenders in meat cutting tech-
niques. 143 One judge may decide that assignment of a corporate
executive to aid a community service group has rehabilitative value' 4
while another judge directs all corporate officers with bidding respon-
sibilities to attend seminars aimed at preventing further violations of
135. See Federal Judicial Conference, An Introduction to the Federal Probation
System 7 (FJC No. 76-1).
136. Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1974); Townsend v.
Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948); see Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958);
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 305 (1932).
137. See Senate Report, supra note 114, at 38; Lopez, The Crime of Criminal
Sentencing Based on Rehabilitation, 11 Golden Gate U.L. Rev. 533, 539 (1981).
138. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1978); Williams v. New York,
337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949).
139. Senate Report, supra note 114, at 38, 41; M. Frankel, supra note 33, at 6-7;
Dershowitz, supra note 114, at 628; Sims, supra note 2, at 699-700; see Harland,
supra note 114, at 425; von Hirsch, supra note 6, at 12-13; Symposium, Appellate
Review of Sentences, 32 F.R.D. 249, 267 (1962) (remarks of Sobeloff, J.) [hereinafter
cited as Symposium].
140. Symposium, supra note 139, at 268 (remarks of Sobeloff, J.).
141. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
142. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
143. Jaffe, Probation With a Flair: A Look at Some Out-of-the Ordinary Condi-
tions, Fed. Probation, Mar. 1979, at 25, 34.
144. See United States v. Mitsubishi Int'l Corp., 677 F.2d 785, 787 (9th Cir.
1982).
[Vol. 52
CORPORATE PROBATION
antitrust laws. 145 Unusual probation conditions reflect an individual
judge's idea of appropriate sentencing techniques, 146 yet there is little
evidence that these remedies achieve sentencing goals.1 47
B. Rehabilitative Purpose of the Probation Act
One of the major causes of disparate sentencing is the broad, almost
undefined, scope of rehabilitative techniques. For this reason, and
because of a general belief that rehabilitation does little to alleviate
criminal behavior, there is serious doubt as to whether rehabilitation
is a proper goal of criminal sentencing. 148 Studies show that programs
aimed at rehabilitation have had little influence on recidivism among
criminal offenders. 4 The focus of corporate sentencing, therefore,
should be on punishment and deterrence of potential offenders. 15 0 The
Probation Act, however, recognizes only rehabilitation as a proper
goal of probation. Thus, the Act is not a panacea for corporate
criminal activity.
V. THE COMPREHENSIVE CRIME CONTROL BILL OF 1983
A partial solution to the problem of corporate criminal sentencing
may have taken shape in Congress in the form of certain provisions of
the proposed Comprehensive Crime Control Bill (Bill). '-' The Bill,
which contains an amendment to the Probation Act, 52 expands the
145. United States v. Missouri Valley Constr. Co., No. 82-L-01, slip op. at 3 (D.
Neb. July 25, 1983), appeal argued, No. 83-2188 (8th Cir. Mar. 15, 1984).
146. See Dershowitz, supra note 114, at 628; cf. Schmidt, Rape Sentence: Castra-
tion or 30 Years, N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1983, at 9, col. 1 (probation condition
providing rapist with choice of castration or thirty-year prison sentence).
147. Cf. Liman, The Paper Label Sentences: Critiques, 86 Yale L.J. 619, 630
(1977) (questioning efficacy of probation condition that price-fixers give public
speeches); Sims, supra note 2, at 703-04 (same).
148. Senate Report, supra note 114, at 38; Allen, The Decline of the Rehabilita-
tive Ideal in American Criminal Justice, 27 Clev. St. L. Rev. 147, 148 (1978); Allen,
The Law as a Path to the World, 77 Mich. L. Rev. 157, 167 (1978); Harland, supra
note 114, at 444-45; von Hirsch, supra note 6, at 7, 10-11.
149. Senate Report, supra note 114, at 40; von Hirsch, supra note 6, at 10-11.
150. H. Packer, supra note 4, at 356; Braithwaite & Geis, supra note 1, at 301-02;
Sims, supra note 2, at 700; cf. Senate Report, supra note 114, at 50 (sentencing
individuals).
151. S. 1762, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3553, at 34-36, §§ 3561-3566, at 40-47, §
3571 (b)(2), at 48, § 3742, at 81-86, §§ 991-998, at 97-120 (1983). The Bill passed the
Senate on February 2, 1984. Taylor, Senate Approves An Anticrime Bill, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 3, 1984, at Al, col. 2. This Note expresses no opinion on the merits of the Bill's
other provisions.
152. S. 1762, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 3561-3566, at 40-47 (1983).
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purpose of probation 53 and provides guidance in sentencing.5 4 The
Bill makes deterrence and punishment proper objectives of proba-
tion. 155 Although some courts have been pursuing these goals under
the Act,156 the Bill gives courts that are currently reluctant to contra-
vene the intent of Congress the statutory authority to consider punish-
ment and deterrence as legitimate goals of probation.
At first impression, the Bill appears to grant courts license to devise
more extraordinary remedies than have thus far been imposed. Along
with the additional options courts have under the Bill, however, they
have more guidance. 15 Courts must impose either fines, community
service or restitution as a condition of probation. 58 The Bill also
provides a non-exclusive list of probation conditions to give courts an
indication of other remedies Congress thinks will be effective.' 9 In
addition, the Bill mandates higher fines for white-collar crime. °
Congress makes clear that it considers fines an under-utilized remedy
that is particularly effective when used in conjunction with other
sanctions.' 6 ' As a result, courts may shed their reluctance to impose
fines large enough to modify corporate criminal behavior. 162 Although
fines alone are not sufficient to control corporate crime, they can be
effective when imposed along with other remedies. 16 3
153. See id. § 3561. Section 3561 provides that probation is a form of sentence
rather than the suspension or execution of sentence. Senate Report, supra note 114, at
59. Proposed § 3562 requires that a judge, when deciding whether to grant probation
and the conditions to be imposed, consider the factors set forth in proposed § 3553(a),
at 34-35. Proposed § 3553(a)(2) includes punishment and deterrence as factors in
sentencing. See Senate Report, supra note 114, at 75-76, 91-92.
154. Senate Report, supra note 114, at 51. See infra notes 164-76 and accompany-
ing text.
155. See supra note 153.
156. United States v. Wright Contracting Co., 563 F. Supp. 213, 214 (D. Md.
1983); cf. United States v. Mitsubishi Int'l Corp., 677 F.2d 785, 787 (9th Cir. 1982)
(court seeking alternatives to fine through Probation Act).
157. See infra notes 164-76 and accompanying text.
158. S. 1762, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3563(a)(2), at 42 (1983); Senate Report, supra
note 114, at 93.
159. See S. 1762, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3563(b), at 42-45 (1983); Senate Report,
supra note 114, at 93. The conditions a court may impose include occupational
restrictions, S. 1762, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3563(b)(6), at 43 (1983), community
service work, id. § 3563(b)(13), at 44, and residence restrictions, id. § 3563(b)(14), at
44.
160. See S. 1762, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3571(b)(2), at 48 (1983). Fines for
organizations are set at higher levels than those for individuals. See Senate Report,
supra note 114, at 106-07. New Jersey has already enacted a statute providing for
higher fines for corporations. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:43-4 (West 1976).
161. Senate Report, supra note 114, at 103-07.
162. See K. Elzinga & W. Breit, supra note 21, at 129-30.
163. See Senate Report, supra note 114, at 103-07.
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More importantly, the Bill provides for a National Sentencing Com-
mission (Commission) to devise detailed guidelines to aid courts in
choosing available sentencing options. 164 The Commission would ana-
lyze different types of offenders and the crimes they commit in order
to develop sentencing guidelines.16 5 Composed of federal judges and
other presidential appointees,16 6 the Commission will consider the
relevance of a complex set of criteria in developing guidelines. These
considerations include the grade of the offense,167 mitigating circum-
stances,6 8 the nature and degree of the harm caused, 6 9 the commu-
nity view of the seriousness of the offense, 70 deterrence 17 and a
variety of offender characteristics. 17 The guidelines would determine
the most effective kinds of probation conditions for particular types of
offenders.173 This would provide expert guidance to courts in fashion-
ing consistent probation conditions for corporate criminals.
Under the proposed Bill, courts would still be free to fashion their
own conditions of probation. 74 In contrast to the present system,
under which only clear abuses of discretion can be appealed, '75 the
Bill allows all sentences outside of the guidelines to be reviewed by
appellate courts. 76 Thus, the problem of inappropriate probation
conditions can be minimized. Admittedly, review of sentencing deci-
sions may dampen judicial eagerness to fashion creative probation
terms. There must be a balance, however, between the need for
individualized sentences and the injustice of disproportionate penal-
ties and inappropriate sentences. The Bill strikes this balance by pro-
viding for the establishment of sentencing guidelines, but allowing for
164. S. 1762, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 991-998, at 97-120 (1983); see Senate
Report, supra note 114, at 51-52.
165. See S. 1762, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 991(b), at 98-99 (1983); Senate Report,
supra note 114, at 59-60.
166. S. 1762, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 991(a), at 97-98 (1983). The Commission
would be a part of the judicial branch and consist of seven voting members appointed
by the President with the consent of the Senate. Two of the commissioners must be
federal judges; the other five members would be selected after consultation with
criminal justice experts. Id.; Senate Report, supra note 114, at 159-60.
167. S. 1762, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 994(c)(1), at 103 (1983).
168. Id. § 994(c)(2), at 104.
169. Id. § 994(c)(3).
170. Id. § 994(c)(4).
171. Id. § 994(c)(6).
172. Id. § 994(d), at 104-05.
173. Senate Report, supra note 114, at 91.
174. Id. at 95.
175. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
176. S. 1762, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3742, at 81-86 (1983); Senate Report, supra
note 114, at 52. In addition, the sentencing judge must state the reasons for imposi-
tion of a particular sentence. S. 1762, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3553(c), at 36 (1983);
Senate Report, supra note 114, at 60.
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individualized sentences when a court determines that a sentence
outside of the guidelines is appropriate. Appellate review is available
only for those sentences that fall outside the guidelines.
The Commission could enlarge the scope of potential remedies by
monitoring long-term probation conditions. Under the current sys-
tem, courts and probation authorities are forced to retain jurisdiction
in order to monitor long-term conditions.177 Because of a lack of time
or inclination to perform such tasks, 178 trial judges either do not
impose such remedies or seek to force the corporate offender to fulfill
the condition in such a short time that an appellate court overturns
the condition. For example, a probation condition requiring a corpo-
rate polluter to develop and execute a program to handle oil spillage
within forty-five days was overturned as unreasonable. 1
79
Under the system established by the Bill, corporate polluters could
be required to develop long-term programs to protect the environ-
ment. 8 0 Corporations are more likely to minimize pollution if they
are forced to bear the costs of such activities. A commission, specializ-
ing in the monitoring of long-term probation conditions, would be
capable of handling such a program."8 Monitoring responsibilities
would provide the Commission with valuable feedback on the effec-
tiveness of various remedies and hopefully inspire it to develop new
guidelines. 182
Another proposal that should be considered by the Commission in
establishing guidelines for sentencing of corporate offenders is the
publicity sanction. 8 3 A corporation's reputation is a valuable asset. 18 4
Media advertising of corporate criminal activity would aid in punish-
177. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3651, 3653, 3655 (1982); Federal Judicial Center, Introduc-
tion to the Federal Probation System 7 (FJC No. 76-1).
178. Cf. Memorandum from Michael J. Luciano, Chief U.S. Probation and Pre-
trial Services Officer to Hon. Constance B. Motley, Chief Judge, U.S. District Court,
S.D.N.Y., Victim impact Statements 9 (Nov. 28, 1983) (available in files of Fordham
Law Review) (suggesting limitation on restitution payments to limit need for moni-
toring).
179. United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 465 F.2d 58, 61 (7th Cir. 1972).
180. See Fisse II, supra note 9, at 991-92.
181. Alternatively, special masters can be appointed to oversee performance of
probation conditions. Cf. City Stores Co. v. Ammerman, 266 F. Supp. 766, 778
(D.D.C. 1967) (possibility of special master to oversee requirements of specific
performance order), aff'd per curiam, 394 F.2d 950, 956 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Schwartz,
The Case for Specific Performance, 89 Yale L.J. 271, 293-94 (1979) (same).
182. See Senate Report, supra note 114, at 51 ("The formulation of sentencing
guidelines and policy statements will provide an unprecedented opportunity in the
Federal system to look at sentencing patterns as a whole to assure that the sentences
imposed are consistent with the purposes of sentencing.").
183. See H. Packer, supra note 4, at 362; Braithwaite & Geis, supra note 1, at 301;
Fisse I, supra note 6, at 108.
184. See Braithwaite & Geis, supra note 1, at 302.
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ment and deterrence of corporate crime due to the effect of publicity
on a company's prestige.' 8 5
An effective publicity sanction, however, must be precisely tai-
lored. For example, a Maine statute utilizing this sanction provides
that a corporation be its own publicizer. 8 6 Aside from the problems of
judicial supervision, it is unlikely that a company will effectively be its
own detractor. In United States v. Blankenheim,18 7 five corporate
executives convicted of conspiring to fix prices were placed on proba-
tion with the condition that they give individually prepared oral
presentations about their crimes to civic groups. 88 The resulting
speeches tended to be self-serving explanations of criminal behavior
rather than embarrassing exercises that would punish the offenders
and deter potential white-collar offenders. 1 9
An alternative to self-publicity would be to establish a branch of the
Commission as the publicizer of corporate criminal behavior. Costs
could be borne by the defendant companies. The method of publicity
could be tailored to meet the requirements of the individual offender
and its offense. In certain cases, such as violations of the securities
laws, it would be appropriate to publicize the crime to the stockhold-
ers of the particular company through a simple mail campaign. In
other cases, such as food adulteration, consumers may be notified
using mass-media techniqes. When the crime is one of pollution, it
may be appropriate to target the community surrounding the offend-
ing plant. The scope and the nature of this sanction should reflect
both the crime committed and the particular defendant.190
CONCLUSION
Effective sanctions to control corporate criminal activity have yet to
be developed. The present legislative system of fines does not punish
or deter institutional crime. The dearth of statutory alternatives to
185. Id. at 301-03; see H. Packer, supra note 4, at 362; see also C. Stone, supra
note 7, at 39 (prestige as a corporate goal).
186. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 1153 (1964); cf. N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1984,
at A16, col. 6 (judicial order that defendant confess from church pulpit that he
helped sell stolen truck); N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1984, at A19, col. 1 (condition of
probation that defendant post sign in front yard declaring he "is a thief").
187. Renfrew, The Paper Label Sentences: An Evaluation, 86 Yale L.J. 590, 590
n.1 (1977) (citing unreported decision, United States v. Blankenheim, No. 74-182,
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 1974)).
188. Id. at 590.
189. See Liman, supra note 147, at 631-32 (1977); Sims, supra note 2, at 703-04.
190. Other proposed remedies include judicially ordered restructuring of internal
corporate processes, Structural Crime, supra note 2, at 365, and limitation of a
company's charter. Braithwaite & Geis, supra note 1, at 307. Alternatives to statu-
tory fines include imposing a monetary penalty on the profits of the company, K.
Elzinga & W. Breit, supra note 21, at 134-37, or requiring the corporation to issue
equity securities to a state victim compensation fund. Coffee, supra note 2, at 413.
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fines has led courts to use the Probation Act in an attempt to control
institutional crime. The development of creative sanctions that com-
port with the Act and the Constitution has, however, eluded even the
most intrepid of courts.
There is no agreement on effective sanctions for the control of
corporate crime. Courts should not be eager to wield their discretion-
ary powers in such an uncharted area. The consensus against the
excessive scope of judicial sentencing discretion suggests that courts
should not use the Act to develop and impose unusual probation
conditions unless these conditions serve the rehabilitative goal of the
Act. Courts that invoke the Act to expand their sentencing alternatives
beyond rehabilitation are relying on an outmoded model of sentencing
premised on discretion that is now recognized as having produced an
incoherent and unfair sentencing system in the United States. Further-
more, the considerable doubt as to whether rehabilitation is a proper
goal of sentencing makes use of the Probation Act to sentence corpo-
rate offenders inappropriate.
The proposed Comprehensive Crime Control Bill provides a firmer
statutory basis for corporate probation than the current Probation
Act. The modified Probation Act contained in the proposed Bill is
tailored to meet the additional goals of deterrence and punishment.
The Commisssion established by the Bill can be both a safegaurd
against inappropriate conditions and a filter through which creative
ideas for corporate sentences can be developed and reviewed.
Marjorie H. Levin
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